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PUTTING THE "PUBLIC" BACK INTO
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AUDREY

G.

McFARLANE*

INTRODUCTION

The use of the public-private partnership for much of what lo
cal governments seek to accomplish, particularly in the area of eco
nomic development, is celebrated in notions and writings about
good government. 1 Because such partnerships involve the adminis
tration of government through informal influence and relationships,
they are also denounced as evidence of an impenetrable web of
structural disadvantage for community residents and property own
ers.2 Buried beneath the furor over Kelo v. City of New London's3
reendorsement of broad city discretion to use the power of eminent
domain for economic development are a number of implicit ques
tions: First, is economic development, as currently practiced, neces
sary? Second, are public-private joint ventures essential to
implement successful economic development? Third, do public-pri
vate partnerships work? Finally, what is the basis for answering the
third question-i.e., on what basis do we measure the success or
efficacy of public-private partnerships? These questions are under

*

Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
See generally STEPHEN GOLDSMITH, THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CITY: RES
URRECTING URBAN AMERICA (1999); Robin Paul Malloy, The Political Economy of
Co-Financing America's Urban Renaissance, 40 VAND. L. REV. 67, 70 (1987) (describ
ing a celebration of public-private partnerships as a successful method of financing re
development); Lynne Moulton & Helmut K. Anheier, Public-Private Partnerships in the
United States: Historical Patterns and Current Trends, in PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNER
SHIPS: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECDVE 105 (Stephen P. Os
borne ed., 2000). But see Michael Keating, Commentary: Public-Private Partnerships in
the United States from a European Perspective, in PARTNERSHIPS IN URBAN GOVERN
ANCE: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 163, 171 (lon Pierre ed_, 1997) (arguing
that the attribution of positive qualities to the public-private partnership ignores power
relationships which ensure that the purposes or goals of the partnership will reflect the
purposes of the more powerful member of the partnership).
2. See, e.g., lotham Sederstrom, Yards Sued on Plan to Grab Land, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Feb. 8, 2007, at 1 (describing the furor over the Atlantic Yards redevelopment).
3. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
1.
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appreciated as broad normative policy questions; they are rarely
asked and even more rarely answered. To the extent these ques
tions are considered at ali, the analysis hinges somewhat unproduc
tively on irresolvable attempts to distinguish between proper public
motives and improper private means. 4
There are tangible and practical reasons for a city and private
actors to align. Ideally, such alignments take place to address goals
jointly that could not or would not be met by either party sepa
rately. The distinction between could and would has been at the
heart of much of the controversy surrounding redevelopment, emi
nent domain, and public-private partnerships. However, once the
term "economic development" is invoked, all analysis usually ends
and these questions are typically not asked. The Kelo decision is
consistent with the courts' general reluctance to question or scruti
nize economic development justifications, no matter how attenu
ated, hopeful, rosy, or improbable. s Instead, economic-develop
ment claims are typically viewed with confidence, and the opinions
cheerfully recite that the validity of the projected benefits are be
yond judicial review.
As the use of economic development has broadened beyond
the inner city to the suburbs and middle-class areas, this traditional
deference has begun to change. 6 Recent actions at the state and
local level have begun to reflect, indirectly, the current public dis
trust of certain public-private partnerships as well as a strong senti
ment that the goals and processes of these partnerships should
embody the interests of the public. Most directly illustrative of this
trend are the flurry of laws that have been passed at the state and
local level to limit the use of eminent domain for general economic
developmenU At least two state-court decisions illustrate this
trend-that the enterprise of economic development and the vehi
cle of the pUblic-private partnership are now subject to some scru
4. See, e.g., id. at 477-78 (describing purely private takings as impermissible); id.
at 501-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the impossibility of this distinction be
cause of the merger of the public and private and how it is pointless to try to "divine
illicit purposes" such as "purely private").
5. See, e.g., Maready v. Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 1996) (rejecting a
state constitutional challenge to business tax incentives based on optimistic predictions
about the projected benefits of jobs and an increased tax base).
6. Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the
21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895, 909 (2006).
7. See Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 657, 659 (2007). Since Kelo was decided, thirty-four states have adopted
some responsive legislation or constitutional amendment. Id.
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tiny. In County of Wayne v. Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme
Court restricted the use of eminent domain to projects in which the
public has a legal right to use or to blight. s In Baltimore Develop
ment Corp. v. Carmel Realty Associates, the Maryland Court of Ap
peals interpreted an "open meetings" law to apply to a quasi
private economic development entity working on behalf of the City
of Baltimore. 9 Communities have also begun to respond, not by
protesting development, but by organizing to negotiate directly
with private developers to assure certain community benefits arise
out of redevelopment projects. lO This variety of activities suggests
that the once sacrosanct and private domain of development is in
creasingly being subjected to some form of external check on behalf
of the public. I will discuss these approaches briefly and then offer
some observations about the benefits and limitations of these at
tempts to increase the "publicness" of public-private partnerships.
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP AND THE PRIVATIZED
CHARACTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Though the aim and work of local governments seem inher
ently public, local governments' history has consistently displayed
both public and private characteristics. II Municipal corporations
and other forms of general-purpose local governments receive a
grant of the states' police and taxation powers to enable govern
ment in furtherance of the public health, safety, and welfare. How
ever, the reality is that many services and activities provided by
local governments are equally capable of being defined as private.1 2
8. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 773, 788 (Mich. 2004).
9. Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 910 A.2d 406 (Md. 2006).
10. See Sharon Pian Chan, What's In It for the Community?, SEAITLE TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2006, at Bl, available at 2006 WLNR 21111718 (Westlaw); Terry Pristin, In Ma
jor Projects, Agreeing Not to Disclose, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at C2, available at
2006 WLNR 23749812 (Westlaw); Milan Simonich, Hill Residents Call for Their Share
of the Arena Pie: Strategy Sessions Held to Secure Pens' Help in Improving Area, PIITS
BURGH-POST GAZETTE, July 29, 2007, at B3, available at 2007 WLNR 14564436
(Westlaw).
11. See Gerald Frug, Property and Power: Hartog on the Legal History of New
York City, 9 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 673, 673-78 (1984) (reviewing HENDRICK HARTOG,
PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983)) (discussing the history of the interaction
between private power and use of city-owned property for profitable purposes).
12. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985)
(rejecting the "traditional governmental function" standard as the basis for federalism
doctrine making states immune from the application of federal law); Ball v. James, 451
U.S. 355 (1981) (determining that a local governmental entity had a nominal and insuf
ficiently public character and performed narrow functions that were not traditionally an
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Also, local governments must find a way to attract the mainstream
economy to operate within their borders, providing tax revenue,
jobs, and other economically beneficial activities.
In many ways, the term "public-private partnership" has saved
city government. City government undertakes very few activities
well enough to avoid being met with criticism or with negative re
gard. In popular discourse, "public" is far too often a dirty word.
Similarly, in local government doctrine, it is on those occasions
when the city's functions are comprehended as private that the city
is perceived more favorably and often given more autonomy as well
as immunity from complying with constitutional guarantees. 13 Pre
sumably, a city acting in a "private" capacity is sufficiently circum
scribed by business-profit motives or operational concerns that act
as a proxy check on the city's exercise of governmental power.
Thus, it would appear that in almost all other public governmental
functions, there is a kind of psychic need for governmental legiti
macy. Unable to supply this legitimacy itself, a city must align itself
with private entities in order to enjoy some of the positive associa
tion, as well as autonomy, to address the public's needs through
employing private, business-like techniques. Ironically, the result
of this driving need to utilize private means to address public busi
ness is both the solution and the problem.
However, one commonly perceived privatizing aspect of local
governments (but inadequately accounted for in the law) derives
from the role that "local leading citizens" often play, both formally
and informally, in influencing the direction of government. Interest
group theory suggests that private business elites can only direct
government to operate in a way that benefits their interests. 14
While the jury is out, however, much skepticism abounds regarding
whether promoting the interests of business elites works to the ben
efit of the pUblic. One significant privatizing aspect of the practice
aspect of government sovereignty and thus need not comply with the Equal Protection
Clause's guarantees of one person, one vote).
13. See, e.g., Ball, 451 U.S. at 362·72; Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1973); Mun. Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273,
277-80 (Utah 1985). See generally KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
SPECIAL PURPOSE GOVERNMENT (1997).
14. See Jeffrey M. Berry et aI., Power and Interest Groups in City Politics 4-6
(Dec. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Western New England Law Re
view) (describing how the evolution of interest group theories from pluralism theories
and elite theories to, most recently, regime theories in order to most accurately describe
the informal working relationships between government and elite citizens). See gener
ally JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLACE (1987).
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of economic development may be the accepted local government
practice of spinning off quasi-private entities as either special- or
limited-purpose governments or public authorities. Public authori
ties, special districts, and even business improvement districts are
all examples of local government structures to which significant
amounts of local government economic development activities have
been transferred. These entities have been recognized in local gov
ernment law as acceptable vehicles to evading state constitutional·
limits on local governments' discretion to issue bonds or raise taxes.
They do not have to comply with other state or municipal mandates
designed to ensure fairness and ethical behavior in public employ
ment or procurement of services. Unfortunately, these controls to
prevent municipal corruption are seen as "red tape"15 because they
seem to come at the expense of nimble responsiveness, flexibility to
adjust to new circumstances, or creative innovation.1 6 These enti
ties, which often take part in the public-private partnership for de
velopment, also make significant portions of public decision making
private. Thus, they are immune from direct, and often even indi
rect, public accountability. For example, the business improvement
district is a form of public-private partnership, indirectly related to
development, where private property owners are empowered to
form something akin to a homeowners' association for neighbor
hoods to take advantage of enhanced services such as security,
streetscape improvements, and sanitationY Not only is the district
taking on duties formerly charged solely to the municipality, it is, in
effect, sanctioning the city's failure to meet formerly expected
levels of municipal services. The city is thus being carved up into
private enclaves, not merely in terms of property ownership, but
also in terms of financing and governance.
15. See Barry Bozeman, A Theory of Government "Red Tape," 3 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 273 (1993).
16. These entities also facilitate intergovernmental decision making and action
without disturbing local government political boundaries allowing joint action while
maintaining separation between city and suburb, or between publicly elected govern
ment officials (Le., the Mayor) and unpopular decisions that can be attributed to eco
nomic realities without political cost. The impact of the decision is thus passed
seamlessly to taxpayers. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 375-78 (1990) (discussing the costs of special
purpose governments to central cities and the benefits to suburbs).
17. See generally Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Im
provement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1999); Audrey G.
McFarlane, Preserving Community in the City: Special Improvement Districts and the
Privatization of Urban Racialized Space, 4 STAN. AGORA 5 (2003), available at http://
agora.stanford.edu/agora/volume4/mcfarlane.shtml.
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More directly connected to development are the set of activi
ties conducted jointly by cities and the private sector that are
loosely termed "economic development." These activities take
place in a myriad of formal and informal ways. Often an indepen
dent agency is chartered by the state or the city, or both, to search
for and attract business relocation or expansion to the locale.1 8 Part
of the attraction strategy at the heart of the public-private partner
ship is to use a public subsidy to facilitate a particular real estate
development project. In return for the public subsidy, the city gets
(1) a success story to promote; (2) needed business activity in the
city and its attendant benefits; (3) the potential for increased tax
revenues through increased taxable activities-though many of the
deals are subsidized by the city foregoing the very taxable increases
one would think were sorely needed; and (4) indirect synergistic
benefits of signaling that the city is on the rise-that the city is the
"place to be."
Because of the shifting nature of public and private in under
standing the methods and motivations of local governments, the
partnership between local governments and private business is
longstanding. However, this relationship is poorly conceived, mis
understood, and mistreated by the law. Sorting through how and
whether public-private partnerships work to fulfill public purposes
is difficult. Some partnerships explode the public-private distinc
tion by intermingling aspects of public powers aligned with private
purposes for profit, and public purposes for improving the city's ec
onomic health aligned with private methods. However, the law's
treatment of these classifications has tended towards extreme defer
ence depending on the economic circumstances.1 9 The greatest im
pact of the public-private partnership is probably mostly one of
perception. Notwithstanding the positive associations that the label
evokes, the techniques utilized recast the perception of local go v
18. See Lynne B. Sagalyn, PublidPrivate Development: Lessons from History Re
search and Practice, 73 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 7, 10 (2007) ("Local officials set up special
public development corporations or redevelopment authorities and staffed them with
business-oriented executive directors who relied on specialized consultants to help com
pare developer responses, price the development opportunity, and analyze the terms
and conditions of the business deals for presentation to the public.").
19. See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 94-95 (2d Cir.
1998) (finding Business Improvement Districts to be special, limited purpose govern
mental entities and, thus, appropriate for fulfilling narrow, i.e., private, purposes). See
generally Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J.
75 (1998); Daniel R. Garodnick, Comment, What's the BID Deal? Can the Grand Cen
tral Business Improvement District Serve a Special Limited Purpose?, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1733 (2000).
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ernments' emphasis and motivation in development as private. The
quasi-private entity set up to pursue development's success is mea
sured by how much it can accommodate private business's interests
and needs. Thus, its emphasis is on commercial success and what
markets define as the most lucrative technique. Due to municipal
inability to provide adequate services, local government law has au
thorized private business districts to manage these neighborhoods.
The financing techniques involve leveraging off future tax revenues
arising from the new developments. It is the very intermingling of
those purposes, therefore, that threatens to subvert, if not
subordinate, the public purposes to those defined or circumscribed
by private interest.
Whether the strands of public and private can be meaningfully
disentangled is made altogether more difficult given the Ubiquity of
public-private partnerships. According to urban planner Lynne
Sagalyn, the public-private partnership has evolved over time
through three stages, each stage progressively more private. 2o
When the federal government played a significant role as financier,
the first stage of public-private partnerships was characterized by
city-initiated projects. 21 The second stage, characterized by the era
of sharply waning federal financial support, also involved city-initi
ated projects, but out of necessity turned to bootstrap techniques
like revenue bonds and tax increment financing. 22 These strategies
were inherently of less general public benefit because the projected
increase in tax receivables or revenue was limited to the district or
the project. Most, if not all, of the increased taxes were used to
repay the district's debt. 23 Thus these projects were of limited ben
efit to the rest of the city. The third and current state of public
private partnership has turned from city-initiated or city-owned
projects to developer- or private-corporation-initiated/owned
projects, now referred to, somewhat ironically, as the private-public
partnership.24 This shift towards private dominance has magnified
the challenge that the public-private hybrid model of development

20. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 7-8.
21. Id. at 8-9.
22. Id. at 9-11.
23. See Peter Eisinger, Financing Economic Development: A Survey of Tech
niques, GOV'T FIN. REV., June 2002, at 20, 22 (explaining tax increment financing).
24. CHRISTOPHER B. LEINBERGER, BROOKINGS INST., TURNING AROUND DOWN.
TOWN: TWELVE STEPS TO REVITALIZATION 5 (2005), http://www.brookings.edu/metro/
pubs/20050307_12steps.htm.
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presents for notions of general public welfare and sharply attenu
ated the democratic accountability issues.
The reality of public-private partnerships is that they involve
pragmatic trade-offs, compromises, and learning by doing. The
public wins some and loses some based on knowledge, expertise,
and market conditions of the city representatives involved in the
deal.25 According to Christopher Leinberger,
The public sector, usually lead [sic] by the mayor or some other
public official, may convene the strategy process but it must
quickly be led by the private entities whose time and money will
ultimately determine the effort's success. A healthy, sustained
partnership is crucial to getting the revitalization process off the
ground and building the critical mass needed to spur a cycle of
sustainable development. 26

But Lynne Sagalyn notes that "public and private players
rarely have, and do not need, equal bargaining power or equal
stakes if risk is proportional to each partner's investment. A public
official's bargaining power is usually greatly affected by the
strength of the local market and the real estate cycle. "27
Thus, apart from how suspicious it may look for cities to be
partnering with private companies for projects that will be privately
owned, the measure of efficacy of these projects for furthering the
public interest will obviously depend on the criteria selected to
evaluate the partnerships. Since these projects are now more fre
25. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 13.
26. LEINBERGER, supra note 24, at 8. Leinberger adds,
The potential roles of the public in this process can vary tremendously based
upon the needs of the particular downtown and how much political capital
politicians are willing to expend in the effort. There are a host of activities the
public sector may be well-positioned to undertake, however, such as improv
ing public safety, increasing transit options and availability, constructing park
ing facilities, attracting and retaining employment, providing appropriate tax
incentives for new real estate development, developing an impact fee system,
assembling land, and perhaps most importantly, creating easy-to-use zoning
and building codes to enable the walkable urbanity that defines a thriving
downtown.
!d. at 9.
27. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 13. Perhaps it is also the case that a business
friendly discourse may contribute to a lack of imagination or creativity in approaches to
development. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (arguing that
our notions of development are too narrowly focused on economic goals and should
include human development goals); see also David Wilson, Metaphors, Growth Coali
tion Discourses and Black Poverty Neighborhoods in a U.S. City, 28 ANTIPODE 72, 73
(1996) (arguing that a "growth discourse[]" exists that guides and limits the direction of
economic development).

2007]

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

47

quently privately owned, and often (but not always) initiated by de
velopers, cities have "less bargaining power than when they [held]
legal title" under an earlier generation of federally funded develop
ment projects. 28 Therefore, in order to answer the question of
whether the public-private or private-public partnerships work, the
predicate questions must be answered: What is the basis on which
to measure the answer to the question? Should such partnerships
be evaluated purely by project completion or the types and levels of
public benefit that result from the partnership?
A.

The Measure of Public-Private Partnership Efficacy

The problem highlighted by the recent focus on the eminent
domain doctrine is whether, and how to measure the extent to
which, the "publicness" of a city's proffered public benefit justifica
tion is adequately demonstrated. The backlash following the Kelo
decision can, in some part, be attributed to the perceived insulation
of public authorities or other independent development entities
from public accountability. One source of the problem for legal
doctrine has been that the consistent goal of public-private partner
ships is to shield their operations from red tape, including public
participation. Thus, a consistent and troubling aspect of public
private partnerships is the extent to which their decision making is
shielded from public accountability. Traditionally, courts have not
adequately dealt with this issue, coming down on the side of the
private part of the deal and finding against democratic accountabil
ity. Cities have been allowed to transfer government functions to
private entities and, based on the formalism of the arrangement, the
enterprises and their decisions have been treated as private. 29 The
popular sentiment, however, has been that some external check is
needed because of economic development's case-by-case, transac
tional deal-making methods. 3D As discussed in the Introduction,
28. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 7. The Urban Development Action Grant
(UDAG) program was a particularly popular and flexible federal funding program for
local economic development. See Duane A. Martin, The President and the Cities: Clin
ton's Urban Aid Agenda, 26 URB. LAW. 99, 108-09 (1994) (discussing the beginning and
end of the UDAG program).
29. See Jonathan Rosenbloom, Can a Private Corporate Analysis of Public Au
thority Administration Lead to Democracy?, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 851, 854 (2005)
(arguing that public authorities, often legally regarded as public governmental entities,
are private corporate entities).
30. See, e.g., Terry Jill Lassar, Introduction to CiTY DEAL MAKING 3 (Terry Jill
Lassar ed., 1990) (discussing tension in government's role in the public-private partner
ship as both regulator and real estate developer).
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the redevelopment scenario described in the Kelo opinion indicates
that the Supreme Court's approach to public-private partnerships
may be idealistically deferentiaL31 It trusts the public-private part
nership and regards the broad goals of development as positive, al
beit indefinable. The dissent, in contrast, regards public-private
partnerships with deep suspicion. 32 Also, the goal of the public
private partnership to further traditional local government projects
through promoting economic development seems too troublingly
vague. 33 In particular, the subsidy to private corporations is viewed
as inherently corrupting. Of course, the truth lies somewhere in
between.
What is unsatisfying about the Kelo decision is that the defer
ence to city government decision making on economic development
is unsettlingly unprotective of existing communities, residents, and
property owners. It provides very little public oversight or check
other than requiring the redevelopment to be undertaken with re
spect to a well-considered plan. 34 Therefore, a more satisfying or
effective external check on public-private partnerships seems in or
der. By taking a hands-off approach under the rubric of federalism,
the Court has thrown these difficult questions back to the states to
resolve. In refusing to provide federal constitutional protection
against the perceived excesses of eminent domain, the Court gave
strong incentive to reject the formerly complacent sense of inevita
bility regarding economic development. It is up to state policymak
ers, both courts and legislatures, as well as ordinary people, to get
involved in how local communities are developing and grapple di
rectly with the real underlying questions about their preferred vi

31.
32.
33.
34.

See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 478-79 (majority opinion) (approving the exercise of eminent domain

"pursuant to a 'carefully considered' development plan" (quoting Kelo v. City of New
London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004), affd, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)). The notion of the
"carefully considered" plan, as discussed in Kelo, is derived from land use regulation
traditions that allow a municipality broad discretion to use zoning regulation to regulate
land use if it is carried out according to some kind of master plan or comprehensive
plan. While most states today, have general mandates to local government to prepare
long-range comprehensive plans, it was not that long ago that cases regularly indicated
how loose a standard of this was. Some states have held that the plan can be reflected
in the nature of the zoning ordinances themselves. See, e.g., Kuehne v. Town of East
Hartford, 72 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1950) (viewing the comprehensive plan as reflected in the
general plan of zoning ordinances.); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public
Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443 (2007).
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sion of economic development. The question is, what do states
think that check on economic development could be?
Perhaps the states are better suited to grappling with the fac
tual nature of the unanswered questions of economic development
and the myriad of factual questions about the level of public sub
sidy or public involvement in a deal. The questions boil down to,
how much public subsidy is actually necessary or justified to make a
particular economic development deal happen? Of course, this is a
case-by-case determination that will vary each time and leads to
even more questions than answers: Is the public subsidy necessary
as an economic, dollars and cents matter, where the deal cannot
take place without the subsidy? Is the public subsidy necessary as a
signal to the mobile developer that the city is business friendly?
How much of a city's contribution to the venture-either through
direct cash, forgone tax revenue in the form of tax incentives, pay
ments in lieu of taxes, tax increment financing, use of eminent do
main to avoid holdouts and keep the acquisition costs low, transfers
to the developer at a subsidized price, or regulatory waivers-re
flects shrewd, bottom-line negotiations and concessions? How
much of the transaction's structure reflects overly friendly relations
among elites and accordingly poor negotiations that unnecessarily
cost the city money in foregone taxes, that cause the publicly un
beneficial nature and location of the development project, i.e., a
soft form of corruption? Should economic development projects be
rated by the most direct and clear-cut approach-that is, strictly by
the city's direct economic return on investment project-by-project?
The difficulty with this standard is that projects, such as stadiums,
convention centers, and festival marketplaces, often fail to measure
up on that basis yet are still widely adjudged to be successes. Why?
It is often because of cumulative, yet intangible, synergies of sym
bolism and the city's improved public image from these large
projects. 35 Both of these intangible synergies are reflected, for ex
ample, in the national development trends that are focused on high
end or upscale development in otherwise working-class cities.
There is an intangible aspect to city development in terms of syn
ergy and energy created, as well as symbolism or signaling that the
city is a place for investment. Large-scale downtown projects prob
ably help jump-start that image by demonstrating what is possible
35. Also, stadium projects are considered to be public, yet they charge exorbitant
profit-driven entry fees that do not make access available to the general public. See
Keto, 545 U.S. at 498-505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (proposing a strict public use mea
sure of eminent domain and listing stadia as an example of a valid public use).
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in the city. How should these synergies count in the evaluation of
the public-private partnership?
The salient feature of these projects may be that public partici
pation is mostly limited to subsidy, either through direct grants,
waivers, or informal shepherding, or through the permitting and
regulatory approval process or the use of eminent domain. Because
local governments are, at least nominally, required to justify their
activities with some kind of public purpose or public benefit, cities
define any development project that creates a new, commercially
viable project as contributing to the public good, regardless of the
ownership structure or planned use. In this climate or scenario, it
seems evident that protecting the pubic interest requires considera
ble vigilance and attention. 36
B.

Putting the "Public" Back in Public-Private Partnerships: Who
Gets to Be Part of the Developing City Via Strict
Scrutiny of Public Use?

I believe that two questions should govern the review of pub
lic-private partnerships. First, who gets to be part of the redevelop
ing city? One problem is that a lot of the new promising
development we see is affluent focused. Cities want, and arguably
need, the affluent among their populations and luckily many afflu
ent people increasingly want to be in cities.37 But when this prefer
ence for the affluent is carried out through public subsidy or public
facilitation in the form of site preparation or exercise of eminent
domain, our latent inability to see structural biases based on race
and class suddenly improve and come into focus.
One solution would be to use a principal of inclusion-socio
economic diversity, community preservation, fundamental fair
ness-to measure public-private partnership efficacy.38 One city
legislative approach reflecting the inclusion principle is an inner
city inclusionary zoning. Baltimore recently followed a small but
growing trend in enacting inclusionary zoning for affordable hous
36. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 17.
37. The "retail concept" is affluence focused. Geodemographic profiling is used
to precisely measure, tap, and shape desirable markets-blue blood estates, young
digerati, big-city blues, and kids in cul-de-sacs. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Who Fits the
Profile: Thoughts on Race, Class, Clusters, and Redevelopment, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
877 (2006).
38. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Con
centrated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1
(2006), where I expand on this point.
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ing by setting aside requirements for all new developments in the
city.39 Subsidized units have to be blended into a project regardless
of location or market focus. Several other jurisdictions have
adopted inclusionary zoning ordinances. 4o The result of recent
grassroots initiatives adopting mandatory inclusionary zoning can
be seen as having implications for the public accountability of the
public-private partnership. In effect, the legislation defines in ad
vance what a public benefit should look like in terms of inclusion
and economic diversity. The proponents of the legislation have
worked closely with developers to create a compromise ordinance
intended to be win-win-inclusion and profit. The difficulty for the
ordinance may arise in upscale projects in a hot market. A hot mar
ket will make it difficult to protect the developer's profit expecta
tion. Moreover, exclusion is part of the upscale formula so some
developers may resist inclusionary units within their projects.
While it is questionable whether inclusionary zoning will benefit the
lower-income population, such measures are still very important as
the new inner city develops.
The judicial approach to what is arguably an indirect inclusion
based approach has taken the form of restricting the city's ability to
use eminent domain by narrowing the definition of public use as
advocated by the dissenters in Kelo and paralleled by the Michigan
Supreme Court in County of Wayne v. Hathcock. 41 At issue was the
Wayne County Department of Jobs and Economic Development's
plan for a 1300-acre business and technology park with a confer
ence center, hotel accommodations, and a recreational facility at
the airport as a hub of future economic activity.42

39. See Jill Rosen, Affordable Housing Bill Passes: Developers Who Receive City
Aid Must Provide Low-Cost Options, BALT. SUN, June 12, 2007, at lA, available at 2007
WLNR 10945348 (Westlaw) (inclusionary housing legislation, adopted after lobbying
by a "coalition of city religious groups, urban advocacy organizations and unions," re
quires builders to reserve twenty percent of units in new developments for low- to mod
erate-income residents).
40. See David Rusk, Inclusionary Zoning: A Key Tool in the Search for Workable
Affordable Housing Programs, PUB. MGMT., Apr. 1,2006, at 18, 20 (inclusionary zoning
ordinances have been adopted by 107 local governments in California, and other com
munities in Chicago, Illinois; Denver, Colorado; Washington, D.C.; Madison, Wiscon
sin; and in the state of Illinois).
41. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). See generally
Symposium, Foreword: The Death of Poletown: The Future of Eminent Domain and
Urban Development After County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 837
(discussing the Hathcock decision).
42. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 765.
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City development has historically taken place around nodes of
transportation such as canals, ports, trains, highways, and now air
ports. The airport project at issue in Hathcock can be seen as a
manifestation of the newest stage of transportation inspired devel
opment, referred to as aerotransport. 43 The Pinnacle Project was
projected to create "[30,000] jobs and [$350 million] in tax revenue,
while broadening the COUIIty's tax base from predominately indus
trial to a mixture of industrial, service and technology."44 It was
also aimed at "enhanc[ing the] image of the County in the develop
ment community, aiding in its transformation [to] an arena ready to
meet the needs of the 21st century."45 Property for the project was
obtained through a combination of condemnation and voluntary
purchase. Owners of nineteen parcels objected on the basis of a
lack of necessity and public purpose under the Michigan
Constitution. 46
The Michigan Supreme Court agreed, overruling the broad in
terpretation of public use in the infamous Poletown case.47 Accord
ing to the court, there was nothing about the County's decision to
exercise eminent domain that served the public good. The only
public benefits would occur after the property had been acquired
and private activity occurred. Thus, the role of the government in
carrying out a public purpose was not enough to render the efforts
of this particular pUblic-private effort sufficiently public. The
court's approach to putting the interests of the public in the eco
nomic development equation was to create a very narrow standard
for public use when the exercise of power involves: (1) a "'public
43. See JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 39 (1991)
(highways and airports are important for development); John D. Kasarda, Aerotropolis:
Airport-Driven Commercial Development, in URB. LAND INST., THE FuroRE OF CITIES
32 (Terry J. Lasser ed., 2000); John D. Kasarda, Logistics and the Rise of the Aerotro
polis, 25 REAL EST. ISSUES 43 (2001); Greg Lindsay, Rise of the Aerotropolis,
FASTCOMPANY.COM, July-Aug. 2006, at 76, available at http://www.fastcompany.coml
magazine/107/aerotropolis.html ("[Clities are always shaped by the state-of-the-art
transportation devices present at the time of their founding .... The state of the art
today is the automobile, the jet plane, and the networked computer."); Stephen J. Ap
pold, Visitor, & John D. Kasarda, Director, Frank Hawkins Kenan Inst. of Private
Enter., Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Associa
tion: Airports as the New Urban Anchors (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://
www.unc.edu/-appolds/research/progress/RegionaIAnchorsMay.pdf.
44. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
45. Id. at 770-71.
46. Id. at 787.
47. Id. (overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)).
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necessity of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable' ";48 (2) transfer
to those enterprises generating public benefits whose very existence
depends on the use of land that can be assembled only by the coor
dination central government alone can accomplish, e.g., instrumen
talities of commerce such as highways, railroads, and canals;49 (3)
the "private entity remains accountable to the public in its use of
the property";50 and (4) selection of land is based on "'facts of inde
pendent public significance."'51 In the court's view, this meant that
the underlying purposes of condemnation rather than subsequent
use of condemned land must satisfy the public use requirement, i.e.,
blight. 52 Thus, the Hathcock court severely curtailed the reasons
that could be offered and, by so limiting governmental discretion,
and in particular by requiring public control of the taken property,
indirectly increased public accountability. According to Marc B.
Mihaly, however, and as the Hathcock decision reflects, a common
problem is that the redevelopment process is thoroughly misunder
stood in the courts. 53 His critique is also useful for understanding
the limits of the debate as framed by the Supreme Court in Kelo. 54
My discussion is focused, instead, on the significance of courts being
willing to intervene in the economic-development project on behalf
of the public.
Another decision reflects an increased willingness of state
courts to intervene in the economic development process on behalf
of the public, this time with respect to how decisions about eco
nomic development should be made. The Maryland Court of Ap
peals answered this question by adopting a principle of public
accountability, signaling a dramatic departure from its prior, con
sistently deferential, approach. 55 In Baltimore Development Corp.
48. Id. at 781 (emphasis added) (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting) ).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 782.
51. Id. at 783 (emphasis added) (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting)).
52. Id.
53. See Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Su
preme Court: Kelo v. City of New London, in THE SUPREME COURT AND TAKINGS:
FOUR ESSAYS 41 (2006), avai!able at http://it.vermontlaw.eduNJEUTakings/6-Mihaly
.pdf.
54. Id.
55. Maryland has long upheld the exercise of eminent domain for economic de
velopment. See, e.g., Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 339 A.2d
278, 287 (Md. 1975). In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki, 916
A.2d 324 (Md. 2007), the court recently reined in the use of Maryland's statutory
scheme for quick-take condemnations. Though the decision, like Carmel Realty, was
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v. Carmel Realty Associates, the court required the city's chief inde
pendent economic development arm to comply with the Maryland's
Public Information Act mandating disclosure in open meetings and
disclosure of public information by city and state entities. 56 Carmel
Realty Associates and other property owners in a major downtown
redevelopment area, known as the Westside Redevelopment, re
sponded to a request for proposals from an independent quasi
governmental economic development agency, the Baltimore Devel
opment Corporation (BDC).57 The owners had a plan to redevelop
their parcels to avoid having to relocate and to participate in the
rejuvenation of the area. In a closed meeting, the BDC Board of
Directors selected a developer to handle the project. 58 Seeking in
formation about how the selection had been made, the owners ar
gued that the Board should be subject to Maryland's Open
Meetings and Public Information Act. 59
The court held that that "the City of Baltimore Development
Corporation is, in essence, a public body for the purposes of the
Open Meetings Act and it is, in essence, an instrumentality of Balti
more City for the purposes of Maryland's Public Information
Act."60 The Kelo decision seems to have provided new impetus for
the Court to begin scrutinizing the accepted structure of the public
private partnership-the quasi-private redevelopment agency. The
court discussed the debate sparked by Kelo, and echoed Justice
O'Connor's dissent: "An external, judicial check on how the public
use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if this
constraint on government power is to retain any meaning."61 Even
though the BDC did not have the power of eminent domain itself,
the court found that the agency "function[ ed] as part of the City's
powers of eminent domain. "62 It appears that in Maryland, Kelo
statutory and not constitutional, it nevertheless signals a significant and noteworthy
change to blind deference to any and all justifications falling under the rubric of "eco
nomic development."
56. Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 910 A.2d 406, 410 (Md. 2006)
(discussing MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 10-501-10-512, -601-10-628 (LexisNexis
2004)).
57. Id. at 414.
58. Editorial, It's About Time, BALT. SUN, Nov. 8, 2006, at 22A.
59. Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 414-15.
60. Id. at 425, 428.
61. Id. at 417 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496-97 (2005)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
62. /d.
The BDC, among other indicia of the exercise of part of the City's powers, is
charged by the ordinance, the contracts with the City, and by its Charter to

2007]

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

55

reinforced that Berman v_ Parker 63 did not merely stand for the
proposition that eminent domain was to be used solely in blighted
areas. Instead, the power could be used for economic development
anywhere. 64 Kelo thus crystallized the enormity of the substan
tively unchecked eminent domain power, in a way that was no
longer limited to inner-city ghetto areas by focusing on blight, but
could be used more broadly potentially in any neighborhood. Thus,
the Carmel Realty court was inspired to disregard the traditional
deferential fiction of the unquestioned benefits of economic devel
opment and acknowledge the reality of the threat of unchecked
power granted to the private developer through the public-private
partnership. This was also made particularly easy in the case of the
Carmel Realty because of the relatively sloppy separation of public
and private functions between the BDC and Baltimore City. This
inartful division empowered the court to refuse to give cognizance
to (i.e., pretend not to see) the relationship between the mayor and
the agency.65 The post-hoc attempt to recharacterize city actions as
private and immune was patent. 66
After this decision, what is the public entitled to receive in
terms of accountability? According to the court, "the Act does not
afford the public any right to participate in the meetings, [but] it
does assure the public right to observe the deliberative process and
the making of decisions by the public body at open meetings."67 Of
course, as limited as this observation sounds in the realm of desira
ble community participation mechanisms, even this level of access
could have a dramatic impact on the substantive nature and direc
tion of economic development decisions. One factual question, to
which the answer is yet to be determined, concerns which parts of
the economic development decision process needs to take place be
hind closed doors. On the one hand, "financial deal-making that is
[traditionally] hidden from view" is likely to become more accessi
coordinate public functions such as the preparation and adoption of urban
renewal plans, and is thus a part of the apparatus used by the City in the
exercise of its urban renewal powers.
/d. at n.13.
63. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
64. See Carmel Realty, 910 A.2d at 417.
65. [d. at 428.
66. See id. at 411 n.6 (noting that when the BDC was formed, some board mem
bers "may have been affiliated with the City of Baltimore ... and ... at least three
members of the Board of Directors were part of then-mayor Kurt L. Schmoke's staff").
67. [d. at 419 (quoting City of New Carrollton v. Rogers, 410 A.2d 1070, 1078
(Md. 1980)).
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ble through disclosure. 68 Disclosure may subject deals to scrutiny
but, will it scare off other potentially lucrative deals?69
Public exposure varies at PPD [public/private development] pro
ject milestones, including RFQ/RFP [request for qualification/re
quest for proposal], developer selection, disposition and
financing agreements, and deal approval. PPD projects are most
open to scrutiny and political debate when they come to public
attention: announcement (site selection, determination of devel
opment program, potential public benefits), approvals (legislative
or voter referenda, if required), and implementation (construc
tion; cost overruns; conflicts, setbacks and collapsed expecta
tions; successful completion). At each such point, community
groups and local officials must strategically defend their interests,
which they do publicly, using the press and other means.7°

On the other hand, according to one public comment by the presi
dent of an independent development entity, the Greater Baltimore
Committee, the BDC's new status could complicate development:
"Private companies are not going to want to have all of their
books opened up just because they are looking to explore a de
velopment opportunity," Fry said. "The reality is that economic
development authorities do have to have some level of being able
to protect proprietary information." "I think that there certainly
is a public interest in having transparency," he added. "But at
the same time though there needs to be protection so that not
everything from the private companies is an open book."71

Therefore, what remains to be seen is the extent to which the
ruling makes a difference and the impact it has on deal making.
The issue remains, can city concessions in a negotiation be ex
amined via public hearing in a vacuum, without understanding the
course, context, and dynamics leading to the deal or transaction, or
possible incrementally cumulative tangible and intangible benefits?
Ideally, the decision should cause a city that is poor at negotiation
to engage in critical self-examination. This is so because prior unre
68. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 13.
69. Although "financial deal making is essentially hidden from view, ... an in
formed media and public watchdog groups can heighten awareness." Id. (discussing
how politics are often characterized not by broad public posturing but the shrewd tacti
cal maneuverings of insiders).
70. [d. at 12-13.
71. Jen DeGregorio, Court Ruling Could Change How Baltimore Development
Corp. Works, DAILY REC. (Balt.), Nov. 6, 2006, available at http://findarticies.comJp/
articies/mLqn4183/is_20061106/ai_nI6823382 (quoting remarks made by Donald C. Fry,
President of the Greater Baltimore Committee, following the Carmel Realty decision).
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viewed decisions will have to be justified convincingly to the public.
Thus, the impact of Carmel Realty's increasing the points of entry
for participation is likely to be highly beneficial. The tradeoff is
likely to be that increased public involvement will be messy and will
slow down time-sensitive projects by adding new uncertainty in an
arena whose costs are measured by investors looking for quick, se
cure returns.7 2 The time value of money is a significant constraint.
C.

Public-Private Partnership and Bargaining with the
Community: Community Benefits Agreements

The final response to public-private partnership can be found
in so-called community benefits agreements (CBAs). CBAs can be
valuable mechanisms for adding the public interest or the "use" val
ues of development; values that are often left out of the develop
ment process. 73 Values such as inclusiveness, transparency,
coalition building, and clarity of outcomes (by providing quantifi
able measures) are often lacking in economic development assess
mentJ 4 The benefits-agreements approach presumes that
development inevitably will take place, but that it is possible to ei
ther lessen the negative impact on existing communities or at least
ensure that the development produces tangible benefits for existing
residents. The inspiration for CBAs was that local governments
ideally would seek to get commitments on behalf of communities
from developers,75 but these arrangements were rarely fulfilled.
This was often because the incentive to comply with the agreement
on the part of the developer would likely be strongest while approv
72. See CHRISTOPHER B. LEINBERGER, BROOKINGS INST., BACK TO THE FUTURE:
THE NEED FOR PATIENT EQUITY IN REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 6 (2007)
(noting that real estate finance no longer regards real estate as a forty-year, long-term
asset, but instead as a short-term asset with a seven- to ten-year horizon).
73. See John J. Costonis, Tinker to Evers to Chance: Community Groups as the
Third Player in the Development Game, in CITY DEAL MAKING, supra note 30, at 155
(stating how a community turns the public-private partnership into a "trilateral rela
tionship"). "Use" values refers to the value residents place on the benefits of using
their neighborhoods. These contrast with "exchange" values, which are the values that
developers or real estate speculators place on the economic benefits to be extracted
from a community. See generally David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely
Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 90-91 (1991) (discussing the
difference between use and exchange values).
74. JULIAN GROSS, GREG LERoy & MADELINE JANIS-ApARICIO, GOOD JOBS
FIRST, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS Ac
COUNTABLE 21-22 (2005), available at http://www.communitybenefits.orgldownloads!
CBA %20Handbook%202005%20final.pdf.
75. Id. at 10.
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als were neededJ6 "CBAs are an attempt to address this problem,
both by memorializing developer commitments in writing and by
enabling community groups to enforce them, rather than having to
rely on local governments."77
In the contractual agreement between representatives of com
munities in which a development project will take place and the
developer, the project's developer promises to provide a variety of
amenities (for example, open space or physical upgrades to existing
buildings or roads) or to take certain beneficial actions (such as first
hire agreements, low-income tenant set-asides, or to provide cash).
In return, the community gives two things: First, it agrees to pub
licly support the development project, sometimes a prerequisite for
developers getting regulatory approvals. Second, it promises to re
frain from entering into litigation against the deveioperJ8
This is a tenuous and limited form of inserting the public into
the pUblic-private partnership for a number of reasons. To begin
with, though the community ostensibly is brought into the deal
making process, it is often a tangential participant. The massive re
development planned in Brooklyn, New York, called Atlantic
Yards, illustrates the problem with coalition-building. "[B]uilding
and maintaining coalitions is difficult, especially if the developer is
seeking to peel off some groups."79 Also, inadequate organizing
could mean that the community's agreement is actually not ideal
and thus sets poor precedent for future projects. 80 From the devel
oper's perspective, the role of the community is less than positive
because the community's power comes from the ability to provide
conflict and opposition. 81 Julian Gross, who has negotiated many
of these CBAs, readily admits that from the community's perspec
tive, there are significant difficulties with these agreements, particu
larly that of monitoring them. 82 The greater problem, however, is
the inherent limitations of negotiating project-by-project and the
76. See id. at 69 (discussing how commitments to provide community benefits
often go unfulfilled and difficulties in monitoring and enforcement are a widespread
problem).
77. Id.
78. Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 12.
79. GROSS, LERoy & JANIS-ApARICIO, supra note 74, at 22-23.
80. /d. at 22-23 ("Community groups want to use past commitments as a 'floor,'
but developers will want to use them as a 'ceiling."').
81. See Sagalyn, supra note 18, at 12 (describing urban neighborhoods as the epit
ome of negative pluralism).
82. GROSS, LERoy & JANIS-ApARICIO, supra note 74, at 70 ("Community groups
should consider how each benefit in a CBA will be monitored. Financial commitments
and other one-time benefits are probably the easiest aspects of a CBA to monitor.
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burdens such negotiations place on grassroots, poorly funded, vol
unteer-based community groups. This means that the reality is that
such resources can only be deployed or marshaled for the large de
velopment projects that have a broader impact, leaving the no-Iess
important smaller projects unmonitored by community participa
tion. 83 According to Gross,
The goal of the community benefits movement is to avoid
this situation by changing the paradigm of land use planning for
large, publicly-subsidized projects or those requiring major land
use approvals. Results of this change will take many concrete
forms: citywide policies providing minimum standards for certain
projects; changes in land use planning documents, like general
plans, to require analysis of economic effects of land use deci
sions; ordinances requiring close scrutiny of high-impact big-box
stores; and an expectation that certain large, prominent, heavily
subsidized projects will have a CBA.84

Possibly the biggest problem for the CBA approach is that the
realized benefits of the agreement will depend on how the project
develops and whether the phases of development come to pass.
This all depends on the market, unexpected expenses, and a variety
of factors subject to unanticipated, but to be expected, change.
Overall, while this type of agreement would benefit from more em
pirical research, it illustrates an attempt to assert the concerns of
local residents-that is, the public, in the public-private
partnership.
CONCLUSION

The new response to the public-private partnership is still
evolving. While participatory mechanisms are probably providing a
role for the public, they are not the only procedural elements that
are missing from the development process. Real substantive stan
dards about the desirable public outcomes for development are just
as, if not more, important. Substantive legislative input would be
most helpful, but there is a conflict of interest at the state and city
level of government that prevents this from happening-cities and
states have a real motivation (some would say it is imperative) to
conduct economic development and a high disincentive to put what
Much more challenging are ongoing tenant commitments, such as living wage and local
hiring requirements.").
83. Id. at 75.
84. Id.
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appear to be obstacles in the path of this important endeavor. Be
cause economic development is so broad and can justify anything,
there is a role for the courts to monitor the development process.
In order to keep the public in the public-private process, it is up to
the courts to give true meaning and application to the array of con
stitutional and statutory checks on the privatization of public power
and protect the public interest in the pUblic-private partnership.
The difficulty is that each of these mandates for "publicness" is
subject to interpretation, and economic development will appear in
an incalculable number of shapes and sizes. Therefore, just as with
the evolution of the regulatory takings doctrine, for example, the
analysis will often be case-by-case and fact specific. With judicial
intervention likely to increase, wherever the specter of eminent do
main looms, it will still be important for legislatures to begin consid
ering substantive mandates that specifically define the public
interest to be protected. Mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances
and community benefits agreements are excellent examples of ap
proaches for getting the "public" back into public-private partner
ships, each of which provides steps towards establishing clear
substantive standards of public benefit for these projects. Though it
is difficult to scrutinize economic development, it is worthwhile.

